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YOU CAN RAISE THE FIRST, HIDE BEHIND THE FOURTH,
AND PLEAD THE FIFTH. BUT WHAT ON EARTH
CAN YOU DO WITH THE NINTH
AMENDMENT?
LAWRENCE

G.

SAGER*

I.

The ninth amendment is singular in a way that ought to command
attention. It is one of a limited number of constitutional provisions that
are about rather than of the Constitution. With the preamble, the
amendment clause (article V), the supremacy clause (article VI), the ratification clause (article VII), and the tenth amendment, the ninth amendment speaks on a conceptually higher level than the remainder of the
Constitution.' These provisions address the birth, change, primacy and
structural meaning of the Constitution itself.
Even within this Special group, the ninth anlendment is remarkable.
Only the ninth and tenth amendments speak directly to broad issues of
substantive content; 2 and this aspect of the tenth amendment 3 is rather
unimportant, since it functions merely as a restatement of the what-yousee-is-all-you-get structure of the national power-conferring provisions of
the Constitution. But the ninth amendment can hardly be dismissed as
unimportant or redundant: its terse announcement that "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people" certainly looks like news, and
begs for an explanation.
* Professor of Law, New York University; Visiting Professor of Law, Boston University.
Jane Cohen, Lewis Kornhauser, Ira Lupu, William Nelson, Aviam Soifer, and Larry Yackle read
this essay in draft form and gave me the substantial benefit of their criticism, as did my students in
the Theory of Constitutional Adjudication Seminar at Boston University. Richard Bernstein rendered vital assistance with the technical historical references.
1. The question of levels is of more than conceptual interest. It is entirely possible, I think,
that attempts to change the pertinent parts of article V or article VI so as to alter the amendability or
status of the Constitution in a fundamental way would be properly understood as unconstitutional.
2. Nominally, the unhappily-worded eleventh amendment, which I have neglected altogether,
also addresses an issue of construction, and does so in terms parallel to the ninth: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed ....
." But the eleventh amendment, even if it is
read in something like a straightforward way, is much too particular in focus to be thought of as
occupying the same kind of ground as are these other provisions.
3. To the extent that the tenth amendment is seen as the textual home of a constitutionally
secured principle of state autonomy that is not merely the by-product of the delegated-powers structure of articles I, II and III, then it assumes a separate importance, of course, but not of the special,
foundational sort that distinguishes the ninth amendment and articles V, VI and VII.
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It does not follow from the singularity of the ninth amendment
either that its importance is narrow or that it can usefully be viewed in
isolation from the rest of the Constitution. With its suggestion that the
whole of the Constitution may not be manifest in its explicit textual stipulations, the great promise of the ninth amendment is what it can tell us
about important general features of the Constitution. Indeed, a foundational account 4 of the Constitution which did not reconcile itself in some
fashion to the ninth amendment would be vulnerable to question. For
just that reason, in turn, a persuasive interpretation of the ninth amendment in isolation is impossible: where the implications of divergent interpretations are so great at the foundational level, the perspectives one
brings to the task of interpretation will be especially weighty ingredients
in the interpretive process.
II.
The ninth amendment is not, in terms, particularly elusive. There is
an obvious way to interpret the stipulation that "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." At the conceptional level, it is easy to
read this language as an indication that the liberty-bearing provisions of
the Constitution are to be understood as prominent and accessible instantiations of a general sense of the proper relationship between a government and its citizens but not as a complete set of the limitations on
government necessary to perfect that relationship. At the functional
level, this reading has its obvious corollary: the amendment announces
that there are valid claims of constitutional right which are not explicitly
manifest in the liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution but which
enjoy the same status as do those made explicit in the text. Given a
constitutional jurisprudence that long since has secured the judicial en4. A satisfactory understanding of the Constitution requires two kinds of accounts. First, we
need an account of the kind of thing the Constitution is, how and what it signifies in our political and
legal culture, and how, in quite general terms, it is to be understood and approached. We need, in
other words, a foundational account of the Constitution. Questions on the order of whether the
Constitution is positive law or merely a collected set of moral principles, whether if law it is accessible by judges in much the same way as other sources of law, whether it is appropriately regarded as a
collection of more or less ad hoc stipulations or as an integrated code of governance, or whether its
written provisions exhaust or merely represent its operational content, are questions within the aegis
of a foundational account. Such a foundational account of the Constitution will very much inform
or predispose the second kind of account necessary to a full understanding of the Constitution-a
substantive account. In a substantive account, content is supplied to the Constitution as a whole or
to specific constitutional provisions by a process that is consistent with the foundational account of
the Constitution. The great promise of the ninth amendment is that it ought to be able to shed light
on important questions that arise in the effort to give a satisfactory foundational account of the
Constitution.
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forcement of the Constitution and applied the central provisions of the
Bill of Rights to the states, this reading of the ninth amendment would
mean in turn that it is appropriate for our constitutional jurisprudence to
validate some claims of right that lack an explicit provenance in the text
of the Constitution, and appropriate for judges to enforce such validated
claims against federal and state governmental actors.
I am not the first person to stumble upon this obvious interpretation
of the ninth amendment, of course. Give or take, it was Justice
Goldberg's view in Griswold v. Connecticut,5 and it has the general support of a thin but venerable line of scholarship, running back at least as
far as Justice Story. 6 But for the most part, judges and scholars have
labored against this straightforward reading. They have had to labor
rather hard. The language and sparsely recorded history of the ninth
amendment surely signify this much: that some sorts of things appropriate to the appellation "rights" were perceived to exist without the benefit
of explicit textual provenance in the Constitution, that these normative
figments could reasonably be thought to be at risk through the introduction into the Constitution of a written Bill of Rights, and that this risk
was serious enough initially to forestall--or at least to be a plausible excuse for resisting-the inclusion of a Bill of Rights and ultimately to require the prophylactic guide-to-construction embodied in the ninth
amendment. Thus, anyone who resists the head-on interpretation of the
amendment has to either find a way of characterizing the unenumerated
rights it canonizes which falls short of treating them as orthodox constitutional rights but which nevertheless satisfies these conditions, or proffer
some other grounds for disavowing the amendment's apparent meaning.
There are four possible readings of the ninth amendment which
avoid the full force of the head-on interpretation. First, the amendment
might not implicate legal norms at all, but rather some other sort of normative animal. Second, the amendment, while involving positive legal
norms, might only concern the protection of state law from federal interference. Third, the amendment, while referencing rights in a more or less
traditional sense, might nevertheless be judicially unenforceable. And
5. 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
6. The line back to Justice Story includes Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987); Black, On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in POWER AND
POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOw 187 (M. McDougal &
W. Reisman eds. 1985); J.ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

34-41 (1980); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
787 (1962); B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955); Corwin, The "Higher

Law" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw (pt. 1), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 152-53 (1928);
and 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 624-25 (4th ed.

1873).
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fourth, the amendment, while otherwise involving full-blooded federal
7
legal rights, might not apply to the states. None of these is easy going.
A.

The Non-legal Animal Thesis

We might understand the ninth amendment as a simple reminder
that the text of the Constitution-including the Bill of Rights-does not
exhaust the domain of political argument. On this view, the amendment
merely affirms the sense of arguments on the order of "It may be constitutional for the state to do that, but it would be deeply wrong."
What there is of an historical record certainly does not support this
view of the ninth amendment. The concerns to which the amendment
was a response were characteristically expressed in distinctly operational
terms. The expressed fear seems to have been that of legal misconstruction, not of the distortion or discouragement of moral or political discourse. Consider these classic and much-thumbed remarks (to which we
will return below): "[A]n imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of the government; and the rights of the people
would be rendered incomplete." 8 Or: "[A Bill of Rights] would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might
follow, by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were
intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and
were consequently insecure." 9
Nor is the Constitution's text particularly congenial to this view.
Consider the ninth amendment in juxtaposition to the tenth:
7. The first and second of these readings center on claims intrinsic to the interpretation of the
ninth amendment itself; they try to deflect the basic thrust of the head-on interpretation. The third
and fourth readings, in contrast, concede the basic thrust of the head-on interpretation, but make
claims involving the intersection of the amendment with other, freestanding notions in our constitutional jurisprudence. My discussion of these claims reflects this difference: the first two claims are
dealt with in the terms in which they are offered, with reference to the language, history and logic of
the amendment and the Constitution in which it is embedded; the second two are considered in the
more conceptual terms apt to the political question and incorporation doctrines.
8. Speech of James Wilson in Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 1787) reprinted in
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 388 (M. Jensen ed.
1976). For further discussion of this speech and a sketch of the evidentiary problems concerning it
and other records of the state ratifying conventions, see infra note 15 and accompanying text.
9. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1834) (Remarks of Rep.
Madison). For further discussion of this speech and its context and for a sketch of the evidentiary
problems concerning the work of the First Congress, see infra note 18 and accompanying text.
Those studying the proceedings and actions of the First Congress should use the Annals with caution, for the records of the debates presented there are of suspect reliability. See Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35-38 (1986)
(criticism of Thomas Lloyd, the principal reporter of the Pennsylvania ratification convention's debates). Further, Leonard White pointed out in his classic The Federalists that there are several
editions of the Annals with varying pagination. L. WHrIE, THE FEDERALISTS 18 n.14 (1948). I
have used the edition with the running head "History of Congress," the one preferred by White.
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The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.
There is symmetry here. The ninth amendment denies for the libertybearing provisions of the Constitution precisely what the tenth amendment confirms for the power-conferring provisions: the applicability of
the principle of expressio unius. The liberty-bearing provisions are not
exhaustive; the power-conferring provisions are.
The two amendments seem to occupy the same general conceptual
space: they are guides to a structural understanding of the Constitution's
enumeration of governmental powers and personal rights, guides to the
actual construction of a document which itself was plainly intended to
enjoy the status of positive law, guides which are presumably intended to
inform positive legal results. Nothing in the structure or language of the
ninth signals that it, unlike the tenth, is to operate only at the level of
extra-legal discourse and judgment. The preamble aside, no other part of
the Constitution addresses itself to government in a purely advisory way,
or in any sense attends to the kinds of matters people ought to take account of in their political discourse and judgment. It would be an odd
turn for the Constitution to take, especially without warning; and the
ninth amendment certainly does not signal such a change of direction.
To the contrary, its formulation-"The enumeration of certain rights...
should not be construed to deny or disparage others . . . ."-suggests
agreement in the status of the rights on each side of the equation.
The sparse record and constitutional text aside, this view of the
ninth amendment is simply far-fetched. To be sure, there is nothing untoward or improbable about the idea that there is a domain of moral
discourse which is not included in the domain of positive constitutional
law. What is implausible is the idea that political actors or persons in the
population at large would be tempted to the view that arguments of political morality lost all force outside the four corners of the Constitution. It
is still more implausible that anyone who was in fact drawn to such a
view would be steered away by a simple textual suggestion (for that is
what the ninth amendment would be reduced to on this view) to the
contrary.
B.

The State Law Thesis

The state law thesis holds that the ninth amendment was intended
and should be construed merely to protect state law from federal interfer-
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ence of a sort not properly countenanced by the Constitution but nevertheless sustainable by an erroneous understanding of the first eight
amendments. In the form most compatible with the language of the
amendment, the claim is that the ninth amendment is there to protect
rights granted by the states to their citizens-by constitution, statute and
common law-against the possibility that the Bill of Rights would somehow unravel these state guarantees.' 0
How exactly might the Bill of Rights have undermined the rights
granted by states to their citizens? Perhaps the Bill of Rights could have
been regarded as a canonical rendition of all valid rights, and have persuaded the people in some or all of the states to devalue and eventually
abandon other rights against state government; or perhaps it is Congress
that might have come to devalue state-granted rights and feel inappropriately free to override them in the course of enacting federal legislation.
But these accounts are essentially retellings of the non-legal animal thesis, and it grows less rather than more plausible with iteration. (No one,
so far as I know, suggests that the ninth amendment actually immunizes
state-granted rights from being undone by Congress as a matter of positive law, or was remotely intended to have such an effect; this would give
artful state lawmakers the ability to insulate almost any state law from
federal legislative preemption, and thus reshape radically one of the most
settled features of our constitutional tradition. t Also, were this its purport, the ninth amendment would have addressed the enumerated powers of Congress, not the enumerated rights which were plainly intended
to limit those powers.)
10. For an exposition of this version of the state law thesis, see Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223 (1983).
11. It is possible that some states wanted the Constitution to be amended in this radical way.
The first amendment proposed by Pennsylvania's ratifying convention to its ratification of the Constitution included a stipulation that could be so read: "[E]very reserve of the rights of individuals,
made by the several constitutions of the states in the Union, to the citizens and inhabitants of each
state respectively shall remain inviolate, except so far as they are expressly and manifestly yielded or
narrowed by the national Constitution." Proceedings of the Meeting at Harrisburg in Pennsylvania
(Sept. 3, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 545 (. Elliot 2d ed. 1863).

Compare the first of a series of proposed amendments offered by the Maryland ratifying convention's Antifederal minority (these amendments were rejected by the full convention but appeared in
Baltimore newspapers after Maryland's vote to ratify the Constitution):
1. That Congress shall exercise no power but what is expressly delegated by this constitution.
By this amendment, the general powers given to Congress, by the first and last
paragraphs of the 8th sect. of art. 1, and the second paragraph of the 6th article, would be
in a great measure restrained: those dangerous expressions by which the bills of rights and
constitutions of the several states may be repealed by the laws of Congress, in some degree
moderated, and the exercise of constructive powers wholly prevented.
Address of a Minority of the Maryland Ratifying Convention (May 6, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 94-95 (H. Storing ed. 1981) (emphasis in original).

1988]

WHAT CAN YOU DO WITH THE NINTH?

The only other possibility along this line is that the role of the ninth
amendment is to avoid a misconstruction of the liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution pursuant to which these provisions themselves
would be understood to constitutionally preempt the rights granted by
states to their citizens. But this seems fantastic. How would the preemption villain of this story have proceeded? Consider the possibility that, in
modem parlance, the Bill of Rights would somehow be seen as having
"occupied the field" of personal rights altogether, divesting the states of
all power to extend personal rights to their citizens. The "occupying the
field" metaphor actually gives this line of the state law thesis a more
plausible gloss than it deserves. In the classic preemption situation of
this sort, the federal government is seen as having taken over some regulatory enterprise and having thereby ousted the states from the same enterprise. But it was clear to the framers that the Bill of Rights only
restricted the federal government; it did not assume any role of restricting the states. Hence, no one could have thought that the Bill of Rights
was taking over the enterprise of "regulating" the states in the name of
personal rights. Moreover, the scope of such a preemption would have
been awesome: it would have devastated the states as independent lawmaking entities, since virtually any state legal norm could be understood
as granting persons rights against the state.
Whittling down the scale of the preemption does not much help
things in the plausibility department. Suppose only those matters "germane" to the Bill of Rights were at hazard. (Note that it makes no sense
to say that the feared preemption would be limited to the exact content of
the Bill of Rights; the whole point is that somehow the states would be
prevented from exceeding the scope of the Bill of Rights.) Could it really
have been feared that provisions in the Bill of Rights-plainly intended
to restrict only the federal government-would be understood as placing
a federal cap on the protections that persons could enjoy against their
respective states? There is simply no reason at all why anyone would
have foreseen this construction; least of all is it plausible that the federalists-whose manifest fears first stayed the Bill of Rights and then induced the ninth amendment-would have had this extravagant concern
on behalf of the states.
Understandably, the most popular version of the state law thesis
takes a different tack altogether. The Bill of Rights, the argument runs,
was thought to pose a threat to the appropriate constitutional order of
things because the express limitations on federal authority in the eight
substantive amendments might be construed to be the only limitations on
national authority, thus expanding the domain of the federal government
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far beyond its intended bounds. On this telling, the ninth amendment is
merely a reminder that the Bill of Rights adds nothing to the power of
the federal government as delineated in the body of the Constitution
proper. 12
The tenth amendment is a daunting obstacle to this version of the
state law thesis. Not only does the tenth amendment do exactly the job
that this claim assigns to the ninth, but the language of the tenth indicates that the framers were capable of expressing themselves quite clearly
when they wanted to negate the possibility of implied or unenumerated
federal powers: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." This version of the state law thesis thus
requires us to treat the ninth amendment as a colossally bad first draft of
13

the tenth.

There clearly were serious concerns on the part of a number of the
states that the Constitution submitted to them for ratification in 1787
could somehow be construed to confer powers on the national government beyond those enumerated; but these concerns were not excited by
guarantees of personal rights in the Constitution, of course, since there
were virtually no such guarantees in the Constitution submitted to the
states. (Virtually none, because the prohibitions against ex post facto
laws, bills of attainder and the suspension of habeas corpus are surely
rights-bearing provisions.) Thus, the calls from Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia and New York for
amendments to the Constitution all included draft proposals that made
explicit the enumerated powers rule of construction.1 4 These proposals
12. A recent example of this view appears in Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1980).
13. This point, of course, has been made before. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 6, at 34-35; Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the FederalConstitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309, 310 (1936).
14. The proposals for amendments recommended by the several state ratifying conventions,
which were those received by the First Congress from states ratifying the Constitution before the
launching of the new government, also appear in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FED-

ERAL CONGRESS (C. Bickford & H. Veit eds. 1986); (Massachusetts-"That it be explicitly declared
that all Powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several
States to be by them exercised." Id. at 12.); (South Carolina-"This Convention doth also declare
that no Section or paragraph of the said Constitution warrants a Construction that the states do not
retain every power not expressly relinquished by them and vested in the General Government of the
Union." Id. at 13.); (New Hampshire-"FIRST That it be Explicitly declared that all Powers not
expressly & particularly Delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several States to
be, by them Exercised." Id. at 14.); (Virginia-"FIRsT, That each State in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this Constitution delegated to the
Congress of the United States or to the departments of the Foederal [sic] Government ....
SEVENTEENTH, That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers be not
interpreted in any manner whatsoever to extend the powers of Congress. But that they may be
construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the case, or other-
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naturally predated the Bill of Rights and were responsive to the draft
Constitution itself; they did not depend upon the prospect of such a listing-out of rights. They speak, as we would expect, in the language of
federal and state power, not of personal rights.
In contrast, the concerns of those who-at least initially--opposed
the inclusion of a bill of rights in the Constitution centered on the impact
that such a specification of rights would have on rights not specified. A
bill of rights was not resisted as a threat to the containment of federal
power, but as a threat to the full realization of the very liberty it sought
to protect. It was, after all, the federalists who initially opposed the inclusion in the Constitution of a bill of rights, and the anti-federalists
whose real and tactical concerns about possible abuses of citizens by the
national behemoth led them to press strenuously for such an explicit
statement of rights against the federal government. Prominent quotations from the federalist stalwarts are familiar, but two especially wellknown statements are worth setting out, in part because of some confusion which is latent in modern readings of them:
James Wilson, at the Pennsylvania convention on ratification:
In all societies, there are many powers and rights which cannot be
particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a constituwise as inserted merely for greater caution." Id. at 17, 19); (New York-"That the Powers of Government may be reassumed by the People, whensoever it shall become necessary to their Happiness;
that every Power, Jurisdiction and Right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to
the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the
People of the several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom they may have
granted the same; And that those Clauses in the said Constitution, which declare, that Congress
shall not have or exercise certain Powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any Powers not
given by the said Constitution; but such Clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain
specified Powers, or as inserted merely for greater Caution." Id. at 19-20). I do not discuss the
proposals offered by the 1789 North Carolina ratifying convention and by the 1790 Rhode Island
ratifying convention, because these conventions submitted these proposed amendments after the
First Congress proposed the Bill of Rights to the states for ratification. See R. BERNSTEIN WITH K.
RICE, ARE WE To BE A NATION? THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 261-72 (1987) and
sources cited therein.
Antifederalist minority blocs from the Pennsylvania and Maryland ratifying conventions proposed their own sets of amendments which they could not persuade the conventions to endorse
formally. These proposals are presented in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 11.
Pennsylvania's proposal appears in 3 id. at 150-52 and Maryland's appears at 5 id. at 94-98. See
especially 5 id. at 94-95 (proposal and explanation by Maryland ratifying convention's Antifederal
minority, quoted supra note 11). See also 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 599 (convention debates, Dec. 12, 1787) (15th proposed
amendment, submitted by Antifederal delegate Robert Whitehill: "That the sovereignty, freedom,
and independency of the several states shall be retained, and every power, jurisdiction and right
which is not by this Constitution expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled").
(The 15th proposed amendment offered on the floor of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention is
omitted from the list of 14 proposed amendments in The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the
Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents, (Dec. 18, 1787),
reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 8, at 618-40, and in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 11, at 147-67).
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tion is an enumeration of the powers reserved. -If we attempt an
enumeration, every thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be
given. The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would
throw all implied power into the scale of the government; and the
rights of the people would be rendered incomplete. 15
James Madison on the floor of Congress, arguing for the amendments
which he had been moved to introduce, echoing the general federalist
and his own previously announced concern 16 that a bill of rights would
15. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 8, at 388 (Nov. 28, 1787). Compare the alternative accounts of James Wilson's statement as
recorded by Jasper Yeates, Anthony Wayne, and Alexander Dallas:
An enumeration of the rights of the people would be dangerous-for what are omitted
are supposed to be excluded. (Yeates)
A bill of rights not even thought of in the Federal Convention; it was absurd. If we
undertake to enumerate and omit any part of the rights of a people, their liberties are
abridged or incomplete; and what is not expressly mentioned is taken for granted or ceded.
(Wayne)
[I]t was not only unnecessary, but on this occasion, it was found impracticable; for
who will be bold enough to undertake to enumerate all the rights of the ieople? And when
the attempt to enumerate them is made, it must be remembered that if the enumeration is
not complete, everything not expressly mentioned will be presumed to be purposely omitted. So it must be with a bill of rights, and an omission in stating the powers granted to the
government is not so dangerous as an omission in recapitulating the rights reserved by the
people ....
In short, sir, I have said that a bill of rights would have been improperly
annexed to the federal plan, and for this plain reason, that it would imply that whatever is
not expressed was given, which is not the principle of the proposed Constitution. (Dallas)
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at
390-91 (emphasis in original).
Readers who find themselves involved with the surviving documentary evidence of the ratification conventions should be aware of the disputed reliability of Jonathan Elliot's compilation of the
debates. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION supra note 11, at 1-639. See Hutson, supra note 9. Quotations in text above
generally follow the Lloyd version, because it is deemed the most complete and reliable by the editors of The Documentary History. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 324-25.
16. [G]entlemen apprehend, that by enumerating three rights, it implied there were no
more. The observations made by a gentleman lately up, on that subject, correspond precisely with my opinion. That resolution declares, that the powers granted by the proposed
constitution, are the gift of the people, and may be resumed by them when perverted to
their oppression, and every power not granted thereby, remains with the people, and at
their will. It adds likewise, that no right of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged,
restrained or modified, by the general government, or any of its officers, except in those
instances in which power is given by the constitution for these purposes. There cannot be a
more positive and unequivocal declaration of the principles of the adoption, that every
thing not granted, is reserved. This is obviously and self-evidently the case, without the
declaration. Can the general government exercise any power not delegated? If an enumeration be made of our rights, will it not be implied, that every thing omitted, is given to the
general government? Has not the honorable gentleman himself, admitted, that an imperfect enumeration is dangerous? Does the constitution say that they shall not alter the law
of descents, or do those things which would subvert the whole system of the state laws? If
he did, what was not excepted, would be granted. Does it follow from the omission of such
restrictions, that they can exercise powers not delegated? The reverse of the proposition
holds. The delegation alone warrants the exercise of any power.
Speech of James Madison at Virginia ratifying convention (June 24, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 231 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). Compare this statement with Letter from James

Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) reprinted in id. at 271-72:
As far as [alterations to the Constitution] may consist of a constitutional declaration
of the most essential rights, it is probable they will be added; though there are many who
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do more harm than good to liberty, but assuaging that concern by reference to his draft of what was to become the ninth amendment (even
fathers of constitutions have their share of labor pains):
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it
might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of
the most plausible arguments that I have ever heard urged against
the admission of a bill of rights into the system; but, I conceive,
that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen
may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.17

By contemporary lights, there is a shuffling of the language of rights
and the language of power here, and that circumstance has been conceived by some to support the state law thesis that the ninth amendment
was all about the cabining of federal authority, not the preservation of
unenumerated personal rights.1 8 These commentators are able to take
further solace from the language of Madison's draft of what was to become the ninth amendment, which perpetuates the shuffle:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of
particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the
powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations
of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.' 9

But even at face value, these formulations on fair reading indicate that
the central concern leading to the ninth amendment was the potential
think such addition unnecessary, and not a few who think it misplaced in such a Constitution. ... My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so
framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration. At the same
time I have never thought the omission a material defect, nor been anxious to supply it
even by subsequent amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by
others. I have favored it because I supposed it might be of use, and if properly executed
could not be of disservice. I have not viewed it in an important light-1. because I conceive that in a certain degree, though not in the extent argued by Mr. Wilson, the rights in
the question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted. 2[.] because there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most essential
rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. I am sure that the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowed much more than
they are likely ever to be by an assumed power ....
3. because the limited powers of the
federal Government and the jealousy of the subordinate Governments, afford a security
which has not existed in the case of the State Governments, and exists in no other. 4. because experience provides the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its
controul [sic] is most needed. Repeated violations of these parchment barriers have been
committed by overbearing majorities in every State.
(emphasis in original). Madison seems to have been heavily pragmatic about the question of a bill of
rights-a question which, in fairness to him, was one of strategy rather than principle.
17. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 439.
18. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 519-20 (Black, J., dissenting); Berger,
supra note 12, at 7.
19. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 435.
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loss to the "rights of the people": these were the rights that Wilson
feared would "be rendered incomplete" by the effort of specification, and
these rights were the rights that Madison acknowledged would be left
"insecure" by a bill of rights which did not include an amendment preserving as did his draft of the ninth the "just importance of other rights
retained by the people."
Beneath the surface of the words of Wilson and Madison as they
appear to the modem reader, this understanding becomes even more
clear. 20 Madison (and quite probably Wilson) used the language of rights
and power in a perfectly sensible way, but in a way different than that
common among contemporary constitutional commentators. For
Madison the power of a government was the net authority of that government to act. In the case of the national government, this meant that
power was restricted by two forms of withholding: the withholding in
favor of the states implicit in the enumerated powers structure of the
Constitution (made explicit in the tenth amendment) and the withholding in favor of personal rights. In such a linguistic scheme, it makes
perfectly good sense to speak, as did Madison, of concern lest the Bill of
Rights give rise to the implication "that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General
Government, and were consequently insecure," and mean simply that
you fear for the loss of rights not specified; and in such a scheme it makes
perfectly good sense to provide against such a misconstruction by stipulating that the specification of rights "shall not be construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to
enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution." But things do not run
in the opposite direction: that is, it does not follow from this linguistic
scheme that Madison would be led to speak of "rights retained by the
people" as a means of referencing withholdings of federal power in favor
of the states. Finally, lest we lose sight of the true object of our attention,
it is worthy of note once again that the final text of the ninth amendment-which closely tracked the draft generated by the House of Repre20. Madison's notes for his speech of June 8, 1789 are given in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 16, at 389-90 n.l. One can get beneath the surface of Madison's remarks in
another sense. In his notes for his speech to the House of Representatives on the Bill of Rights (from
which speech the quote at supra note 16 is taken) Madison indicates, as he did not in the speech
itself, that he saw state bills of rights as posing the same kind of risk to unenumerated rights that a
federal bill of rights would pose. This seems contrary to the view that what troubled Madison about
a federal bill of rights was the possibility that such a listing out could preempt explicit state personal
rights, but entirely consistent with the idea that it is unenumerated federal personal rights that
Madison saw as in peril. Caplan, supra note 10, at 255, cites the Madison notes, but seems to
overlook their negative significance for his view.
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sentatives' "Committee of Eleven" on which Madison sat 2 '-is all about
rights; the language of power was reserved for the tenth amendment.
C.

The Judicial Unenforceability Thesis

The unenumerated rights memorialized by the ninth amendment
might be just what they seem to be-personal constitutional rights which
enjoy the status of positive law-yet not be enforceable by the judiciary.
That, after all, is the fate of those few, exotic matters that the federal
judiciary treats as falling within the ambit of the political question doctrine, and not altogether different than the judicial restraint prescribed by
the doctrine of deference with which the federal judiciary approaches a
considerably more generous range of constitutional questions. 22 But
while deference is a familiar part of the constitutional landscape, its invocation requires some explanation; and the radical non-justiciability of the
political question doctrine remains a rare deviation from the Marbury v.
Madison 23 norm, a deviation requiring powerful justification. The assignment of the whole lot of unenumerated rights referenced by the ninth
amendment out of the hands of the judiciary before we have even considered what rights these might be demands a warrant that is far from
obvious.
The apparent impulse behind the judicial unenforceability thesis is
the sense that somehow democratic theory is better served if electorally
accountable officials are the exclusive guardians of the unenumerated
constitutional rights of the people. But remember the context in which
this notion arises: presumably, we are not fighting the battle of Marbury
v. Madison again; and we are assuming for the moment that the
unenumerated rights addressed in the ninth amendment have the status
of positive constitutional law. (It is certainly true that one brand of democratic theory might seem to encourage a reconsideration of this assumption, even at the cost of turning our backs on the ninth amendment; we
will consider this brute force approach to the ninth amendment below in
section III.)24 With these premises in place, the argument from demo21. The Committee draft read, "The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." House Committee Report, July
28, 1789, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note

14, at 29. On August 17, 1789, a motion by Antifederal Representative Elbridge Gerry (Mass.) to
strike out "disparage" and insert "impair" failed for lack of a second. 4 id. at 29 n.22. See also 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 783.
22. The statute of limitations has run, but my views on these matters remain close to what they
were in Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1212, 1220-28 (1978).
23. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. See infra text at p. 254.
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cratic theory is singularly unpersuasive.
Consider what a judicially unenforceable constitutional norm is like:
it is legal authority, binding on all persons and institutions that fall
within its reach, supreme over competing sources of positive law except
those which share its federal constitutional status; it lacks only in its susceptibility to judicial enforcement. 25 If there are unenumerated, judicially unenforceable constitutional rights as promised by the ninth
amendment on this reading, those rights command the respect of governmental actors whose conduct could transgress them; in the absence of
judicial enforcement those actors are still obliged to winkle out these
rights and to respect them at the expense of the conflicting impulses of
their constituents. The problem from democratic theory thus does not
go away, but simply travels with the burdens of obedience and
enforcement.
Thus, there is nothing about elected non-judicial officials that qualifies them specially to respond to the rights referenced by the ninth
amendment; 26 and conversely, there is nothing about judges that disqualifies them specially. Indeed, just the reverse would seem to hold. Legitimate claims of constitutional right that do not enjoy an explicit textual
27
provenance are especially needy of the independence and coherence
best promised by the judicial process: independence because constitutional rights that do not announce themselves may be especially vulnerable to neglect; and coherence because the identification of such rights
should depend on the judgment that they are of a piece with the broader
28
jurisprudence of the Constitution.

25. Sager, supra note 22, at 1220-28.
26. I made a similar argument in Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 417, 436-41 (1981).
27. I addressed the question of coherence in judicial decision-making informally in Sager,
What's a Nice Court Like You Doing in a Democracy Like This?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1087, 1099-101
(1984); and formally (with my colleague Lewis Kornhauser) in Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the
Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 102-15 (1986).
28. This last observation might be met with a contrary argument, as follows: In the end, Marbury and our sustained commitment to judicial review are premised on the empirical judgment that
the risk of constitutional courts running amuck (Lochner) is less to be feared than the risk of unrestrained elected officials cheating on the Constitution (e.g., Margaret Thatcher banning the SpyCatcher). But in the absence of a textual tether the running amuck risk grows so large as to reverse
our ordinary judgment about these competing institutional hazards. Hence the justification for treating claims of unenumerated rights as political questions.
But, in the end, it is the good judgment of judges and structural limitations in and on the
judicial process that we depend upon in our post-Marbury institutional arrangements, not the tether
of constitutional text. The Lochner era, of course, makes this point from one direction: between the
contracts clause, the takings clause, the substance gloss on the due process clause, and the enumerated powers structure of the power-conferring provisions of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
had more than enough textual support to make any amount of trouble. Conversely, the great restraint which characterizes the Court's treatment of economic regulation and federal power issues in
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D.

The State Immunity Thesis

The rights encompassed in the ninth amendment's allusion to
"others, retained by the people" might be members of the constitutional
pantheon in good standing, but signify only as restraints on the federal
government. This comparatively modest reservation about the ninth
amendment shifts the discussion from doubts about the proposition that
there are valid claims of constitutional right which lack an explicit textual provenance to the question of whether such claims should run
against the states as well as the federal government.
None of the fights-bearing provisions in the Bill of Rights run
against the states of their own force, of course. 29 But under the impulse
to spread the constitutive norms of constitutional justice to all governmental entities, we have construed the fourteenth amendment to incorporate most of the Bill of Rights and make them applicable to the states.
(The same impulse has led to the conclusion that the due process clause
of the fifth amendment makes the norms of the equal protection clause
applicable to the federal government.) The question, then, is whether
there is any good reason to treat the claims of right referenced by the
ninth amendment as ineligible for incorporation by the fourteenth
amendment.
An argument to this effect might proceed as follows: "What distinguishes those norms in the Bill of Rights which we deem to have been
'incorporated' into the fourteenth amendment and hence made applicable to the states from those which we deem not to have been transmuted
in this fashion is the centrality of the incorporated norms to the project
of personal liberty to which the Constitution in general and the Bill of
Rights in particular is committed. Notions of constitutional right which
do not derive from the ratified text of the Constitution can be, at best, of
the modem era does not emanate from textual exegesis of the Constitution, but rather from judicially
developed theories of the Constitution's project of just the sort required by any sensible use of the
ninth amendment.
It is not the case that every sane society would opt for our institutional arrangements per Marbury. Many have not. But those arrangements have served us quite well on the whole and evulsive
changes are not on the table. Within the framework of those arrangements, the case for exceptional
treatment of unenumerated rights simply has not-and I believe cannot--be made.
29. In some hands, the argument for the state immunity thesis turns instead on the historical
observation that the ninth amendment, like all of the provisions in the Bill of Rights, was not about
limiting the states, nor about increasing federal power; rather it and they were about restricting
federal power. See Berger, supra note 12, at 8-14. But of course this is persuasive if at all as an
argument against incorporation in general, not about the rights referenced by the ninth amendment
as special candidates for non-incorporation. Professor Berger sees incorporation as a colossal and
reversible error. See, e.g., id. at 12-13. I am inclined to see incorporation as the laudable result of
our correct understanding of the status of the Constitution, not as an embarrassment. See infra text
p. 257.
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only peripheral significance. Accordingly, if there are rights that pend to
the ninth amendment, they surely do not qualify for application to the
states."
Selective incorporation is a rather awkward doctrine, but it is easy
to see how we got to it. Most of the Bill of Rights' provisions seem to be
central elements in a common understanding of constitutional justice;
this is especially true because many of the provisions we would be inclined to think of in this light are pitched at a rather high level of generality, and in the act of interpreting them we conform them to a common
understanding. Some provisions, however, while germane to the enterprise of constitutional justice, are at once particular in their demands and
peripheral to the understanding which drives the enterprise. These latter
provisions are not an embarrassment, since they do no real conceptual
harm, but neither do they commend themselves for insertion into the
fourteenth amendment by force. Hence the impulse to parse among the
provisos in the Bill of Rights.
But matters are different in the realm of extratextual rights, where
there is no pre-analytical stipulation of nominal rights. A claim of constitutional right unsupported by explicit text should not commend itself
except upon a showing that it shares in the essence of our constitutional
enterprise; there is no other justification for the embrace of such a claim.
It gets things just backwards, therefore, to reason from the absence of
textual support to the conclusion that a claim of right is marginal to the
organizing vision of political justice underlying our constitutional
jurisprudence.
III.
The implausibility of any of the interpretive options returns us to the
head-on interpretation of the ninth amendment-to a metaconstitutional
understanding of the liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution as significant but incomplete instances of a general vision of the boundaries of
legitimate governmental behavior. But we would gain little if we rested
our examination of the ninth amendment without a consideration of the
foundational impulse that has driven so many constitutional analysts to
avoid the amendment's obvious meaning. That impulse, I think, is
majoritarianism.
Majoritarianism holds that the grounds of legitimate governmental
choice is the conformity of that choice with the popular will. For the
majoritarian, the Constitution itself must be reconciled with popular will;
typically, this has drawn majoritarians to a view of the Constitution
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which centers on its status as enacted law. On this account, the legitimacy of the Constitution depends upon the majoritarian bona fides of the
process through which it was originally adopted and subsequently
amended. This in turn has led many majoritarians to view the Constitution-Bill of Rights and all-as a closed system of more or less freestanding textual stipulations. For majoritarians of this stripe, principles
of constitutional justice must be endorsed by explicit provisions in the
Constitution's text: textual explication is essential because it alone is a
durable tether to the will of the populace that blessed the Constitution
with ratification.
There may well be other theoretical constructs than majoritarianism
which lead to the view that constitutional interpretation must be confined to explicit text as the essential tether to the ratifying will. If so, the
problem of reconciliation with the ninth amendment that we are about to
consider will dog these theories as well. So the comments which follow,
while addressed to majoritarianism, can be generalized over the family of
theories that have this common meta-interpretive payoff.
Taken straight, the ninth amendment raises obvious difficulties for
the text-as-tether view: it flatly contradicts an insistence on explicit constitutional text. We ought to take a moment to focus on just why this
contradiction is troubling. It is not the case, after all, that documents or
persons which announce that they are to be interpreted in a certain way
necessarily have to be listened to. The command "follow my orders precisely!" is logically presumptuous in a remarkable sense: it presumes exactly what it purports to direct, namely that the commander is entitled to
be listened to strictly. 30 (There is a notorious example of this sort of
conundrum in our constitutional jurisprudence. In round three of a famous nineteenth century dispute over land title, 31 the high court of Vir30. See Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 495-97 (1981) for a discussion of "interpretive intent."
31. In brief (and to many readers, familiar) sketch, the litigation involved a dispute between
Martin, who claimed title by devise from Lord Fairfax of a large chunk of Virginia, and Hunter, who
claimed title by grant from the state of a mere 788 acres of that land. Hunter's claim depended on
the lawfulness of the seizure of Fairfax's land by the state, and Martin's claim on the immunity of
those lands against seizure by virtue of two treaties. Crucial to the force of the treaties was a question of the timing of Virginia's purported seizure. In round one, the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled
for Hunter (Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee, 15 Va. 218, 232 (1810)). In round two, the Supreme Court
of the United States reversed, finding for Martin (Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, I I U.S. (7
Cranch) 603 (1813)). In round three, the outraged Virginia Court of Appeals disputed the authority
of the Supreme Court itself. With separate opinions by each of the court's four judges, the Court of
Appeals unanimously held that the Supreme Court of the United States was not superior to the high
court of Virginia or any other state, and was not constitutionally empowered to direct such courts to
revise their judgments (Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 58 (1814)). Round four is discussed in the text
accompanying note 32. The controversy-including the great personal, professional and political
rivalry between John Marshall and the President of the Virginia Court of Appeals, Spencer Roane,
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ginia held that the Supreme Court of the United States lacked
constitutional authority to review state court decisions; in round fourwhich we know as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee 32-the Supreme Court reversed, solemnly assuring the Virginia tribunal that the national court
could indeed exercise this power under article III of the Constitution.
The problem, of course, is why the high court of Virginia should listen to
a Supreme Court which it had already determined had no authority over
33
the matter at hand.)
But the problematic status of interpretive intent or interpretive commands in general can offer no solace to constitutional theorists who have
already decided that their job is to obey the textually specific commands
and only the textually specific commands of the Constitution. These theorists are unwitting members of a family which you will recognize as
soon as I introduce some of its members: the male army barber under
orders to shave all those men but only those men who do not shave themselves, his sister, who regularly asserts that "No generalities are true,"
and their ne'er-do-well cousin who reluctantly admits that everything he
says is a lie. Constitutional theorists who take themselves to be bound to
the explicit commands of the Constitution are placed in the same position of self-reference and self-contradiction by the ninth amendment,
which textually commands them to abandon their bounds.
As conversation pieces, paradoxes of this sort are amusing, and even
which was prominent in the background-is detailed in 4 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 144-67 (1919). The curiosity, of course, centers on round five: surely the Virginia Court had
no analytical reason for treating the Supreme Court's judgment, as to its own power, as binding.
(The thought that the question is political rather than analytical is reinforced by the replay of these
events in a modern context with very different results, as described infra note 36).
32. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
33. As suggested supra note 31, the ultimate outcome in the Fairfax land litigation was neither
analytical nor inevitable. Things went very differently in a modem Rhodesian paraphrase of the
Virginia litigation. After its unilaterally declared independence in 1965, the Rhodesian government
denied the validity of its earlier (1961) constitution, and rejected all forms of legal subordination to
England. The Rhodesian courts endorsed the premise that the new (1965) Constitution was valid,
and held that English authority no longer reached Rhodesia. Dhlamini v. Carter,2 S.A. 467 (1968).
But England continued to assert its authority, and the Privy Council-in the course of hearing a
criminal appeal from Rhodesian preventative detention (Madzimbarnuto v. Lardner-Burke, 2 S.A.
284 (1968))-held the 1965 Constitution and the entire Rhodesian regime to be invalid under the
1961 Constitution. The Privy Council's ruling of course included the vital proposition that it was
still entitled to act in review of the Rhodesian courts, notwithstanding the 1965 constitution's provisions to the contrary. This set the stage for criminal appellants in another Rhodesian case to argue
that their indictments were invalid because they charged offenses under the regime of law declared
unconstitutional by the Privy Council. This placed the Rhodesian judiciary in the position of choosing up. Buttressed by lengthy and learned opinion the Rhodesian judges (with explicit reference to
their own situations as employees of the new constitutional regime) did the inevitable. R. v. Ndhlovu, 4 S.A. 515 (1968).
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instructive.34 But when dilemmic moments like this crop up within the
precincts of a real-world program for interpreting the Constitution, the
logical paralysis they carry becomes a matter of no little concern. To
appreciate the bleak options open to text-as-tether theorists who confront
the ninth amendment, imagine that we had their assignment.
We could, of course, simply ignore the ninth amendment; but, without more, that would be an unjustified lapse from our commitment to
serve the explicit provisions of the Constitution. Or we could struggle to
interpret our way around what our interpretive methodology would
otherwise indicate was the full and fair meaning of the ninth amendment
in order to avoid embarrassment to our entire enterprise; but that would
simply be another form of lapse, of course. However tempting, these
courses could not commend themselves as compatible with our
responsibilities.
So suppose we just give in. It might seem instinctually wrong to
float away from the text of the Constitution as the ninth amendment
dictates, but after all a text-specific order is a text-specific order. Why
not simply obey this one? Unfortunately, things are not so simple. If our
commitment to explicit text is for some good reason, like the foundational view that the exclusive grounds of legitimate governmental choice
is conformity with the popular will, then that reason itself will be confounded by obedience to the ninth amendment's interpretive command.
The majoritarian provenance of the ninth amendment is not sufficient,
any more than would be that of a ratified constitutional amendment
which created a feudal monarchy.3 5 As majoritarians we could not accept the perfectly enacted command to give ourselves over to a monarchy, and as majoritarians we cannot accept the directive of the ninth
amendment, since it insists that we consult some source other than the
enacted constitutional text to inform constitutional decisions that will
prevail over the will of contemporary social majorities.
If we cannot join the ninth amendment, suppose we try to beat it: in
light of our foundational commitment, we could disavow the message of
the ninth amendment with regret, and continue with our general enterprise of text-specific constitutional interpretation of everything else in the
Constitution. We would not be simply ignoring the amendment, but
rather making a studied judgment that the same foundational commit34. Interested lay readers owe themselves the pleasure of R. SMULLYAN, WHAT IS THE NAME
OF THIS BOOK? (1986).

35. See Sager, supra note 26, at 443-44.
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ment which draws our allegiance to the Constitution requires that we
disregard some of its stipulations.
This seems a relatively cheap way out of our bind. True, a piece of
the Constitution has to be jettisoned, but this would not be the first time.
(The contracts clause is one instance that comes to mind. Even after its
second coming36 it is much reduced from its once vital form.) The model
for this proposal is the situation in which a statute provides for X, Y, and
Z, a court finds that Z is invalid, the court severs and nullifies the invalid
part, and then the court proceeds to enforce the balance of the statute.
But the ninth amendment, unfortunately, is not a discrete branch which
can be pruned leaving the rest of the constitutional tree intact. The ninth
amendment has general implications for the liberty-bearing provisions of
the Constitution which cannot be ignored without unseating our project
of text-specific interpretation.
Let me make the point by shifting the story for a moment. Imagine
a game of constitutional interpretation-"The Unenumerated Powers
Game"-with the following instructions:
Assume that the tenth amendment has been replaced by an amendment stipulating that the enumerated powers of the federal government are only instances or examples of a general police power
possessed by the national government. Everything else about the Constitution is the same. This one change aside, you are to construe the
provisions of the Constitution-including, of course, the first three articles-with strict regard to the intent of the framers.
The instructions to this game are not only bizarre, but incoherent. Construing article I "with strict regard to the intent of the framers" is impossible once the enumerated powers structure is turned inside out. The
best we could do, in one sense, would be to read the list of congressional
powers in article I, section 8 as narrowly and consistently as possible in
order to see them as instantiations of a comparatively limited understanding of the "general police power" possessed by the federal government. Even this modest move in the direction of the actual intent of the
framers would have its problems, since whatever was gained would be at
the expense of the generous spirit of the initial rule of the game.
Reading the ninth amendment out of the Constitution in order to
remain faithful to our (assumed-for-purposes-of-playing-this-possibilityout) majoritarianism is futile in the same way as is the unenumerated
powers game. The ninth amendment confirms that the liberty-bearing
36. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); and Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 886 (1978). But before investing too heavily in
contract clause futures, see Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400
(1983), and Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
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provisions of the Constitution and Bill of Rights were responsive to notions of political morality; that they were not disembodied acts of capricious will that somehow gained widespread support; that they were
linked as part of a more general understanding; and that they were not
exhaustive of the fabric of which they were a part. To read them as selfcontained and exhaustive is to badly misread them, if one is in pursuit of
the enacted text as a tether to the will of the enacting generation. To be
sure, it is logically possible to blind ourselves to the ninth amendment
and reject the picture of the liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution
that it advances: we can read and interpret the Constitution clause by
independent clause, eschewing links and respecting lacunae. But what
could we possibly hope to gain by the exercise? Surely not our
majoritarian objective of conformity with the enacted Constitution: the
trauma to the interpretive milieu of the liberty-bearing provisions of the
Constitution caused by the repudiation of the ninth amendment is simply
too great. In effect, we have just pushed the paradox of the majoritarian
reader of the ninth amendment to another level; we have not surmounted
it.
Somewhat more complicated is the status in light of the ninth
amendment of sophisticated versions of majoritarianism. John Ely, for
example, has argued for an interpretive regime pursuant to which the
explicit text of the Constitution is augmented by judicial doctrine, but
only to the limited end of perfecting the majoritarian process.3 7 Consider
two arguments on behalf of Professor Ely's claim, one foundational and
38
the other substantive:
Foundational:
(a) We begin with majoritarianism as our foundational account of the
Constitution, and conclude accordingly that we are bound to the explicit text of the document as a tether to the will of the ratifying
population.
(b) Then we observe the lesson of the ninth amendment that the explicit rights-bearing provisions of the Constitution are instantiations of
a broader understanding of the proper relationship between a government and its citizens, a relationship secured in part by unenumerated
positive legal rights.
(c) Finally, we conclude that the only way we can make sense of
these apparently conflicting demands is to let loose of the text as required by (b), but at the same time to confine our interpretive freeflights to the project of perfecting the majoritarian process, in order to
avoid doing violence to (a).
37. See J. ELY, supra note 6.
38. See supra note 4, for a discussion of the distinction between foundational and substantive
accounts of the Constitution.
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Substantive:
(a) We start with a non-majoritarian foundational account of the
Constitution, an account which does not bind us to the explicit text of
the document, but rather directs us to fit the rights-bearing provisions
of the Constitution and the tradition which pends to them into a general understanding of the proper relationship between a state and its
citizens.
(b) In response to the metaconstitutional mandate of (a), we develop
the required understanding of our tradition of constitutional rights,
pursuant to which it emerges that the object of the individual rights
aspects of the Constitution is the protection of the majoritarian
process.

(c) Accordingly, the project we assign to the constitutional judiciary
is the perfection of the majoritarian process.
The problem with the foundational argument should be familiar: it
perpetuates the paradox of the ninth amendment and majoritarianism.
The move from a majoritarian foundational account directly to an insistence that interpretive access to the Constitution be confined to oversight
of the majoritarian process suffers the embarrassment of Procrustes:
there is simply too much left over. The majoritarian who follows Ely on
foundational grounds39 remains in much the same quandary as the simple, text-bound majoritarian. By artificially truncating the scope of the
interpretive enterprise, this move renders incoherent the ongoing commitment of the majoritarian to pursue the enacted intentions of the
framers.
The substantive argument does not suffer from this difficulty. It is
logically possible that an unrestricted inquiry into the project of the Constitution-the project of which the rights-bearing provisions of the Constitution are non-exhaustive instantiations--could result in the
conclusion that it is all about the perfection of the majoritarian process.
Were this the case, an exclusive commitment to that project would of
course be entirely consistent with the metaconstitutional mandate of the
ninth amendment. But this would not be majoritarianism in the foundational sense, a political theory brought to the Constitution; it would be a
substantive interpretation taken from the Constitution. The difference is
crucial. Suppose we were taking up the question of whether the constitutional recognition of an autonomy right along the lines of the right of
privacy was appropriate. The argument in favor of recognition would
have to include a substantive account of the Constitution's project pursuant to which the right of privacy was essential; that account would of
39. Ely himself relies on the foundational claim from majoritarianism (though he appears to
believe the substantive claim to be true as well). See J. ELY, supra note 6, at 4-9; cf id. at 88-101.
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course contradict the perfection of the majoritarian process account, and
we would have to choose between these competing interpretive renditions
of the Constitution. What would not be on the table, though, is a disposing foundational claim from majoritarianism that would rule the right of
privacy account out of order.
In the end, majoritarian objections to the ninth amendment simply
cannot work. To the contrary, it is majoritarianism which is imperiled
by the witness of the ninth amendment. This is an important proposition, of course, since it disqualifies support for a prevalent understanding
of the Constitution. (The ninth amendment is not the cause of the difficulty, but merely an insistent reminder of the important structural reality
of the Constitution which is the cause of the difficulty-just as the tenth
amendment is a reminder rather than a cause of the enumerated powers
structure of the Constitution.) If the ninth amendment does nothing
more than help defeat majoritarian misunderstandings of the rights-bearing provisions of the Constitution, it will have served well.
It does not follow from the defeat of majoritarianism, however, that
the ninth amendment prevails. All we have done is dispatch what may
have seemed like a formidable objection to taking the amendment at face
value and pursuing the methodology it commends. For the ninth amendment's understanding of the rights-bearing provisions of the Constitution
to command our analytical allegiance, we must arrive at a foundational
view of the Constitution that leads to an interpretive stance consistent
with the amendment's reminder of the nature of the constitutional enterprise. Since we know that majoritarianism and other text-as-tether foundational views are unable to make peace with the Constitution itself, the
incentive to develop such a foundational view is great.
IV.
One question is bound to arise from a serious encounter with the
ninth amendment: have we (judges, scholars, and other constitutional
decisionmakers and commentators) been getting it wrong all these years?
After all, the ninth amendment has been relegated to a dark comer of the
constitutional closet into which almost no one seems anxious to poke. If
such a neglected piece of the Constitution is really as central to the meaning of the rights-bearing provisions as I have suggested, it is reasonable to
wonder whether we have bungled the business of constitutional interpretation in some chronic, endemic way. (There lurks the opposite point, as
well: namely, that an interpretive adverse possession sets in after 200
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years pursuant to which claims that jar settled sensibilities should be
barred.)
There is no methodological generalization that holds over the run of
our constitutional jurisprudence, of course, but I think that prominent
features of our constitutional tradition can best be explained as reflecting
rather than defeating the structural understanding of the Constitution for
which the ninth amendment stands. The most distinct of these is the
doctrine of incorporation, which is a chronic conceptual embarrassment
to constitutional analysts. Nothing about the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, of course, offers any comfortable support for imposing Bill of Rights limitations on the states; and the job of explaining
ourselves in this regard is made if anything more difficult by the selective
nature of the incorporation process, pursuant to which small parts of the
Bill of Rights have been omitted. As troubling as these matters may be,
they recede in the face of the baldly prochronistic doctrine that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment incorporates the principles which
underlie the equal protection clause (ratified roughly 100 years later).
Salvaging operations have been mounted, in the form of the observation
that the privileges or immunities clause would provide a better fourteenth amendment home for incorporation, 4° and the suggestion that we
ought in any event live with the mistake of incorporation in the name of
stare decisis. 41 But I think these analytical patches miss-indeed obscure-the point. Almost no one really believes that incorporation in
either direction is a mistake; and the impulse to affirm incorporation
owes little or nothing to a subliminal reading of the privileges or immunities clause message. Rather, we understand the liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution to reflect a general view, or project, of political
justice. In the face of that understanding, we are naturally moved to
spread the reach of those provisions to all governmental entities; and in
the face of that understanding, confinement to the explicit text of the
42
Constitution is no virtue.
The right to travel and the right of privacy (both of which happen to
be infelicitously named 43) are also prime exhibits, of course. Neither has
an explicit textual basis in the Constitution. While the right of privacy
has been the object of dispute, that dispute on the whole has been about
40. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
41. See, e.g., Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
723, 728-29 (1988).
42. See supra text pp. 249-50.
43. The right to travel is close, but Professor Gunther's "right to interstate migration" is surely
more to the point. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 832 (1 lth ed. 1985). The right to privacy
is simply misleading; it is of course an autonomy right, not a privacy right.
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the application of the right, not its basic legitimacy as a strand of constitutional analysis. The right to travel is perhaps a more compelling example for those who have yet to come to terms with the right-of-privacybased notion that there are some matters of personal choice not involving
speech or religion which are simply outside the reach of governmental
fiat. No one seems troubled by the right to travel. To the contrary, the
Supreme Court-correctly I think-points to the absence of an explicit
textual home for the right with pride, as a kind of evidence of the centrality of the right to the constitutional project of which it is indisputably a
part.

44

Beyond discrete prominences like incorporation, the right to travel
and the right of privacy, there is a more general pervasive way in which
constitutional law is compatible with the ninth amendment. Equal protection has been fortified to bar racial segregation, protect voting rights
and apportion electoral power, and restrain discrimination on grounds of
gender, legitimacy and alienage; the establishment clause has been rediscovered and given a strangely variegated life of its own; a broad and
complex tapestry of speech centered liberty has been woven; the contract
clause has waxed, waned, waxed and waned again. Everywhere in the
jurisprudence of constitutional rights there runs the sense of a sustained
project to define and maintain the proper relationship between government and its citizens. The text of the Constitution itself is seldom more
than a point of departure in the effort.
V.
There is a tendency among those who choose to read the ninth
amendment to mean what. it says to be rather picky with their own
choice of language; these concerns with terminology are wrapped up with
more basic matters, and merit attention. The phrase "ninth amendment
rights", for example, is disfavored, since what the amendment actually
does is offer an interpretive gloss for the liberty-bearing facets of the Constitution as a whole. This raises the question of just where the non-textual claims of constitutional right countenanced by the ninth amendment
are to find their constitutional home. It is not at all clear that rights
which lack the support of explicit text are advantaged by being assigned
to catch-all textual phrases. The right to travel and the right to privacy,
for example, do just fine on their own. Claims of this sort cannot float in
the air; they are woven into the fabric of constitutional justice, with sig44. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 759 1 (1966).
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nificant ties to the explicit liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution.
But banding them with text as general as "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States" or as misused as "due process" neither aids
nor usefully records the process of evaluating these claims in light of our
constitutional jurisprudence.
VI.
Our titular point of departure was the question of what you can do
with the ninth amendment. The answer, I think, is simply this: you can
remember the ninth amendment. (Once you have done so, it is not at all
clear what you can do with majoritarianism as a foundational account of
the Constitution.)

